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Brinkerhoff: Criminal Law - Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony - The Standard Ad
CRIMINAL LAW-Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony. The Standard of Admissibility in Wyoming-Anything Goes? Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280
(Wyo. 1982).

On October 9, 1980, Washakie county jailer, Ted Logan,
returned from work and found a burglar in his home. A
struggle ensued and the intruder struck Logan on the head
with a hammer and fled. On that same day Logan gave a
general description of the intruder to Washakie county investigator, Dan Stewart.1 In order to obtain a better description, Logan was hypnotized on October 14, 1980, by
a Thermopolis city police officer. Because more than one
suspect matched the description Logan gave during the first
hypnosis session, he was hypnotized a second time.2
After the first session, Investigator Stewart considered
Robert Chapman to be a suspect and he approached Chapman
and made observations of Chapman's personal appearance.
At the second hypnosis session, again attended by Stewart,
Logan added more details to his previous descriptions of the
intruder.3 The hypnosis sessions were videotaped but the
tapes were mostly inaudible.' Hours after the second session Chapman was arrested and, shortly thereafter, Logan
identified him from a photo line-up! No physical line-up
was ever used by the authorities to identify Chapman as
the burglar and the first time Logan identified him in person was at the preliminary hearing.'
At trial the defendant objected to any identification
testimony from Logan because it was enhanced by hypnosis.
The district court ruled that the state could not present
any hypnosis evidence unless the defendant opened the gate
on the subject.7 The state was to be restricted to Logan's
identification of Chapman based upon what the state contended to be Logan's observations at the time he was assaulted. The state presented Logan as a witness and, without referring to the hypnotic session, he identified Chapman
CopyrightO 1983 by the University of Wyoming.

1. Brief for Appellant at 2-3, Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982),
reh'g denied.
2. Id. at .4-5.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 4-8.
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280, 1281 (Wyo. 1982).
Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 8.
Id.

7. Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d at 1281 (Wyo. 1982).
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in court as the intruder. Officer Stewart testified that Logan had previously identified Chapman from a photo line8
up.
The defendant "opened the gate" by cross-examining the
victim at length about the hypnosis sessions; the defendant
also presented his own expert testimony regarding hypnosis.
The jury found Chapman guilty of burglary.9
On appeal Chapman argued that testimony from a witness whose memory has been hypnotically refreshed is inadmissible unless a foundation for the testimony is laid by
demonstrating the procedural safeguards used to ensure the
reliability of the hypnotic procedure. ° The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and rejected the appellant's suggested foundation requirements as improper and
unworkable. 1 The court found that testimony from a previously hypnotized witness does not require a foundation
relating to the reliability of the procedures involved because
it is for the fact-finder to judge the credibility of such
testimony. 2
This note will briefly survey the history of hypnosis,
discuss the use of hypnosis in the courts, and review the development of the law concerning hypnotically refreshed testimony. After analyzing the court's holding, the author will
suggest that the court failed to heed the call for safeguards
raised during the evolution of the law in this area and,
therefore, failed to mandate any safeguards at all. The
author will argue that, absent certain essential safeguards,
hypnotically refreshed testimony should be inadmissible.
I.

HYPNOSIS--WHAT IS IT?

The American Medical Association defines hypnosis as
a condition of altered attention in which the subject manifests alterations in consciousness and memory, increased
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 2930.
11. 638 P.2d at 1284-85.
12. Id. at 1284-85.
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susceptibility to suggestion, and the production of responses
and ideas atypical of those occurring in the usual state of
mind."3 Webster's dictionary simply defines hypnosis as a
"state that resembles sleep but is induced by a hypnotizer
whose suggestions are readily accepted by the subject."' 4
Hypnosis is an ancient phenomenon rooted in the practice of artificially induced somnambulism. 5 Very little is
known about the practice of hypnosis prior to the late eightteenth century when modern interest and research into the
phenomenon was first recorded." Controversy has surrounded hypnosis from then to the present. Periods of intense interest followed periods of condemnation and disrepute, and hypnotism became associated with spiritualism,
faith healing, and fakery.' Since World War II, however,
hypnotism has regained some respectability. During the mid
1950's, the American and British Medical Associations formally approved its medical use and today a minority of
psychiatrists use hypnosis to treat mental and emotional
conditions.'" Hypnosis is now an accepted tool for psychotherapy, the treatment of psychosomatic illnesses, anesthesia,
and the enhancement of memory recall for medical therapy.'"
Recently, hypnosis has also been widely used to enhance
memory recall of witnesses in pre-trial investigations. Certain characteristics of the hypnotic trance have created unre13. COUNCIL ON MENTAL HEALTH, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186,

187 (1958).
14. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, 563 (rev. ed. 1976).

15. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use of PretrialHypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 312, 317-18 (1980) (quoting Rogers, Egyptian Psychotherapy, 9 CIBA SYMP. 617, 621 (1947)).
16. The late eighteenth century was the era of Franz Anton Mesmer's "Animal Magnetism". The Viennese physician developed a treatment of illness
by touching the patient with supposed transmissions of magnetic influences
from the therapist to the patient. Mesmer's disciple, the Marquis de
Puysegur, treated a peasant for a toothache and while making his customary "magnetic passes" discovered that his patient fell into a trance-like
state but was able to talk and answer questions. This is the first documented case of the induction of artificial somnambulism, later known as
hypnotism. Diamond, supra note 15, at 318 n.18 (quoting MARQUIS DE
PUYSEGUR, MEMOIRES POUR SERvIR A' L'HISTOIRE ET L'ESTABLISSEMENT DU
MAGNETISME ANIMAL, 28-33, 390 n.131 (London 1786).
17. Diamond, supra note 15. at 318 .(quoting J. BRAMWELL, HYPNOSIS; ITS
HISTORY, PRACTICE AND THEORY passim (2d ed. 1906).
.18. Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d at 1288 (Wyo. 1982) (Brown, J., dissenting)
(citing .12 ENCYCLOPEDIA -BRITANNICA 24 (1964)).
19. COUNCIL ON MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 13, at 186.
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solved legal issues regarding the reliability of hypnotically
refreshed testimony. Most authorities agree that, while hypnosis can sometimes produce remarkably accurate recall and
can be a valuable investigative tool, it can just as often yield
sheer fantasy, willful lies, or a mixture of fact and fantasy
called confabulation. A most serious problem is the impossibility for either the subject or the hypnotist to tell which
portions of the recall have been confabulated. For these
reasons, the experts largely agree that, as a truth verifying
procedure, hypnosis is unreliable."
II. AN OVERVIEW OF HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED
TESTIMONY AND THE COURTS

The use of hypnosis in legal proceedings is a relatively
recent development. The rules governing the admissibility
of hypnotically enhanced testimony were developed mainly in
cases decided within the past twenty years. The issue of
admissibility has arisen primarily in two contexts. The first
involves efforts by the defendant to introduce exculpatory
statements made while under hypnosis in order to prove the
truth of the matter asserted. The law in this area is well
settled: such statements are inadmissible in every jurisdiction where the issue has arisen since it is impossible to determine whether the hypnotized defendant related actual facts
or merely invented information.21 Within the second context are efforts by the prosecution to introduce incriminating testimony by a witness whose memory has been previously refreshed by hypnosis. The law in this area is in a
state of flux.
A. The Early Cases-Per Se Admissibility
The first decision concerning the use of hypnosis to
refresh the memory of a witness was the 1968 case of Har20. See, e.g., Diamond, supra note 15, at 313, 335; Orne, The Use and Misuse
of Hypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL HYPNOSIS 311,
317-18 (1979); Spiegel, Hypnosis and Evidence: Help or Hindrance? 347
ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 73, 79 (1979); Spector and Foster, Admissibility
of Hypnotic.Statements: 18 the Law of Evidence Susceptible? 38 OHIO ST.
L. J. 567, 584 (1977).
21. People v, Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 782-83, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243
(1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3220 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1982) (No. 82-78).
22. Id. 641 P.2d at 783.
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ding v. State." The prosecuting witness, a victim of attempted rape and attempted murder, was hypnotized by a psychologist to help restore her memory of the events which transpired after she was shot." Under hypnosis she was able to
recall more details concerning the attempted rape.25 On appeal from his conviction of assault with intent to rape, the
defendant argued that the pretrial hypnosis rendered the
victim's testimony inadmissible.2 Based solely on the ground
that the witness believed her memory to be accurate, the
Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed the conviction
and summarily dismissed the challenge to the hypnotically
refreshed testimony.' The court then held that the fact that
the witness's memory had been refreshed by pre-trial hypnosis went to the weight and not the admissibliity of the
evidence.2
During the next ten years, the general rule of admissibility set forth in Harding spawned a series of similar decisions permitting witnesses to testify to recollections assertedly refreshed by hypnosis.2 In People v. Shirley, the
California Supreme Court reviewed the history of these postHarding cases and concluded that the courts had mechani23. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968).
24. Prior to being hypnotized, the victim.was able to recall that she had been
with the defendant in his car and that the defendant became angry with
her for her refusal to have sex with him and that he shot her. But she
could recall very little about the attempted rape after being shot and she
related conflicting stories to the authorities concerning the incident. Several
weeks later the victim was hypnotized by a clinical psychologist who had
been fully briefed concerning the facts of the case. Police officers were
present during the hypnosis sessions but the hypnotist denied making any
improper suggestions to the subject. Id., A.2d at 304-08.
25. Id. at 305.
26. Id. at 306.
27. The Harding court stated:
The admissibility of Mildred Coley's testimony concerning the
assault with intent to rape case causes no difficulty. On the witness stand she recited the facts and stated that she was doing so
from her own recollection. The fact that she had told different
stories or had achieved her present knowledge after being hypnotized concerns the question of the weight of the evidence which
the trier of facts, in this case the jury, must decide.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Some of the cases that followed the Harding rule include: Kline v. Ford
Motor Co., Inc., 523 F.2d 1067, 1969-70 (9th Cir. 1975) ; Wyller v. Fairchild
Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974) ; Clark v. State, 379 So.
2d 372, 375 (Fla. App. 1979); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 205 S.E.2d
240, 241 (1974); State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414, 427
(1978); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312, 315 (1971).
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cally followed the Harding rule with little or no analysis of
the issue.30
B. The Emergence of Procedural Safeguards
In People v. Shirley the California Supreme Court
traced the evolution of the law in this area and, specifically,
the emergence of safeguards."1 As the 1970's came to an
end many courts began to take notice of the dangers inherent in the use of hypnotically refreshed testimony and began
to develop increasingly complex procedural "safeguards" to
ensure the reliability of such testimony. 2 In United States
v. Adams33 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the
Harding rule to allow for the first time in that jurisdiction
the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony in a criminal
case."4 However, in permitting such testimony, the court
warned that "investigatory use of hypnosis on persons who
may later be called upon to testify in court carries a dangerous potential for abuse."3 The court warned that great
care must be taken to ensure that the witness testified from
his own recollections rather than from recall tainted by suggestions received while under hypnosis. 6 The court proposed
several safeguards that it apparently believed would eliminate the potential for abuse." The same court reaffirmed
30. 641 P.2d at 785. The Shirley court held:
In the earlier cases, as in Harding, the courts engaged in little or
no analysis of the issue, and merely reiterated the general proposition that the fact of hypnosis "goes to the weight, not the admissibility of the evidence." If they discussed the point at all, the
courts simply noted that the witness believed he was testifying
from his own memory and that his credibility could presumably
be tested by ordinary cross-examination.
Id.
31. Id. at 785-94.
32. Id. at 785.
33. 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1978).
34. Id. at 198-99. Previously the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had applied
the Harding rule only in civil cases. See Kline v. Ford Motor Co., Inc., 523
F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506
(9th Cir. 1974).
35. 581 F*2d at 198-99 (1978).
36. Id.
37. The court stated:
We think that, at a minimum, complete stenographic records
of interviews of hypnotized -persons who later 'testify should be
maintained. Only if the judge, jury, and the opponent know who
was present, questions that were asked, and the witness' responses
can the matter be dealt with effectively. An audio or video record"
ing would be helpful.
Id. at. 199 n.12.
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its holding in Adams in a subsequent case 8 and explained
that the purpose of the Adams safeguards was "to ensure
that post-hypnotic statements are truly the subject's own
recollections. ' ' s
The Illinois Court of Appeals followed the Harding rule
in People v. Smrekar" but recognized that the use of hypnosis
involves certain inherent problems. The court pointed out
that an individual under hypnosis is subject to the hypnotist's suggestions and his own fantasies."' The court therefore allowed the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness only because the record demonstrated the presence of
certain safeguards which supported the reliability of the
testimony. The court emphasized that the hypnotist was a
physician with extensive experience with hypnosis; only he
and the witness were present during the hypnotic interview; the hypnotist denied that he had suggested the identification to the witness; the identification was corroborated;
and the witness had ample time to view the defendant at
the time of the crime.42
In later cases the required safeguards became more
8 the New Jersey Supreme Court
complex. In State v. Hurd"
adopted an intricate set of mandatory procedural safeguards.
The court recognized the following dangers inherent in hypnosis: the subject's extreme suggestibility, loss of critical
judgment, tendency to confabulate, and excessive confidence
in his new "memories"." To minimize the risks the court
adopted the following procedural prerequisites:
1) The trial judge should evaluate both the kind of
memory loss suffered and the hypnotic technique
used to restore the memory, based on expert testimony from both sides.4
38. United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 885 (1979).
39. Id. at 669 n.2.
40. 68 111. App. 3d 379, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979).
41. Id., 385 N.E.2d at 853.
42. Id. at 854-55.
43. 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981).
44. Id., 432 A.2d at 94-95.
45. Id. at 95.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

7

342

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 9
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW
Vol.

XVIII

2) The court should then inquire into the subject's
amenability to hypnosis since some subjects are
more suggestible than others."'
3) The party offering the testimony must then
prove that he has complied with at least six additional procedural requirements to ensure a "minimal level of reliability[.]""7
The six additional requirements 8 were suggested by
Dr. Martin T. Orne, an expert on hypnosis. Prior to the
Hurd case, two New York trial courts adopted an even more
intricate set of nine prerequisites to the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony.49 Recently, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals adopted the six-prong Hurd test as the
proper standard of admissibility in that jurisdiction.
C. Harding Discredited: The Frye Test
Rather than just adopt a set of procedural safeguards,
some courts began to judge the admissibility of hypnotically
induced testimony in the light of the test set forth in Frye v.
United States.5 This test for admissibility of scientific evidence was adopted by courts many years ago to reduce the
danger that unproven scientific techniques might mislead
or prejudice juries. 2 The Frye rule requires that before
evidence based on a new scientific method can be admitted,
it must be demonstrated that the technique has been generally accepted by authorities in the pertinent scientific field."
46. Id. at 96.
47. Id. at 96-97.
48. The six requirements may be summarized as follows:
(1) the hypnotist must be a psychiatrist or psychologist experienced in the use of hypnosis; (2) the hypnotist must be independent of the prosecution or defense; (3) all information given to
the hypnotist before the session must be recorded; (4) before the
session the subject must describe in detail to the hypnotist the
facts as he remembers them and the hypnotist must not influence
that description; (5) all contacts between the hypnotist and the
subject must be recorded, preferably on videotape, and, (6) no one
but the hypnotist and the subject can be present during the prehypnotic examination, during the hypnosis session, nor during the
post-hypnotic interrogation.
Id.; See also Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d at 1283 (Wyo. 1982).
49. People v. Lewis, 103 Misc. 2d 881, 427 N.Y.S.2d 177 (County Ct. 1980);
People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (County Ct.
1980).
50. State v. Beachum, 97 N.M. 682, 643 P.2d 246, 253 (1981).
51. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
52. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 203 (2d ed. 1972).

53. Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1014 (1923).
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The first case to depart from the Harding approach and
apply the Frye analysis was People v. Hangsleben24 There
a defendant sought to introduce evidence at trial that, by
virtue of pre-trial hypnosis, he could remember the "real
culprit", even though he had previously confessed. The
court distinguished Harding and held that the hypnotic evidence was properly excluded because the defendant "failed
to establish the reliability of hypnosis as a memory-jogging
device." 5 The court ruled that the defendant failed to demonstrate the general scientific acceptance of the theory of
memory restoration by hypnosis as required by the Michigan version of the Frye test."
In State v. Mena" and State v. Mack, 8 the Arizona and
Minnesota courts applied the Frye test and found that, because hypnosis has not gained general acceptance as a reliable means of obtaining accurate recall of previous events,
the testimony of a witness who has been hypnotized to refresh his recollection is per se inadmissible in a criminal
trial." Both of these cases were reaffirmed in 1982.0 The
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch0 ' also applied the Frye test but declined to make
such testimony inadmissible per se. Instead, the court held
that hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissible in
the absence of conclusive proof of the reliability of hypnotically retrieved memory.2
Recent cases have continued the trend toward adoption
of the Frye analysis. In State v. Palmer 3 the Nebraska
Supreme Court held that the procedural safeguards of Hurd4
were impractical and the court excluded hypnotically enhanc54. 86 Mich. App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539 (1978).

55. Id., 273 N.W.2d at 544.

56. Id. at 545.
57. 128 Ariz. 226, 624 P.2d 1274 (1980).
58. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980).
59. State v. Mena, 624 P.2d at 1279-80 (1980) ; State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at
768 (Minn. 1980).
60. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court. 132 Ariz. 180, 644 P.2d 1266, 1269
(1982); State v. Blanchard, 315 N.W.2d 427, 430 (Minn. 1982).
61. 436 A.2d 170 (Pa. 1981).
62. Id. at 178.
63. 210 Neb. 206, 313 N.W.2d 648 (1981).
64. See supra note 46, and accompanying text.
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ed testimony because it was not widely accepted enough to
satisfy the Frye test. 5 And, in People v. Shirley, the California Supreme Court "abandoned any pretense of devising workable 'safeguards'" such as those in Hurd and held
that testimony of witnesses who have been hypnotized to
restore their memory is inadmissible per se for failure to
satisfy the Frye analysis."6
In Polk v. State," 13 years after it first enunciated the
simple Harding rule making hypnotically enhanced testimony virtually admissible per se, the Maryland Court of
Special Appeals recognized the potential for abuse of hypnotically enhanced testimony.68 Following the lead of other
jurisdictions"' the Maryland court rejected the Harding rule
and adopted the Frye analysis as the proper test of admissibility of such testimony and, thereby, joined the growing
number of jurisdictions that mandate procedural safeguards."
In Polk the victim of a sexual assault, who had no recollection of the incident, was hypnotized on behalf of the prosecution. The defense objected to the testimony of the "unqualified" hypnotist and that of the victim since such testimony was the product of an "inexact and unproven science." 7 1 Relying on Harding, the trial court denied the
motion to suppress and held that the hypnotically enhanced
nature of the testimony "goes to the weight of the testimony
rather than the admissibility." 2 On appeal the Maryland
Court of Special Appeals ruled that Harding had been undermined when, in 1978, the Maryland Court adopted the Frye
test for admissibility of scientific evidence." The court reversed the lower court ruling and held that the testimony
of the previously hypnotized witness should be excluded be65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d at 655 (1981).
641 P.2d at 786-87, 796 (1982).
48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981).
Id., 427 A.2d at 1049.
Id. at 1047-48 (citing State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 764 (1980); State v.
Mena, 624 P.2d at 1274 (1980)).
Polk v. State, 427 A.2d at 1048 (1981).
Id. at 1043-44.
Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1046-47.
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cause there had yet been no determination by the relevant
scientific community that hypnosis is generally acceptable
for the purpose of memory retrieval. 4 The court in Polk
also stated that even if the court had found that the Frye
test had been satisfied, the testimony was not necessarily
admissible. Citing the "dangerous potential for abuse" of
hypnosis, the court suggested that certain procedural safeguards be employed by trial judges to determine the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony."'
D. Problems With Hypnotically Refreshed Testimony
Since hypnotically enhanced testimony was first held
admissible in 1968,76 awareness of the problems inherent in
such testimony has steadily grown. Recently, in deciding
the issue of admissibility, the Arizona Supreme Court identified some of the more serious of those problems." A summary of the court's discussion follows:
1. Suggestion. A person under hypnosis is subject to
"hypersuggestibility and hypercompliance." 8 Being so suggestible the subject can graft onto his memory fantasies or
suggestions delibrately or unwittingly placed there by the
hypnotist.7 ' The previously hypnotized witness may sincerely believe that the events suggested actually occurred. 0
2. Confabulation. Even under hypnosis a subject can
experience gaps in memory. However, the subject frequently
has a tendency or willingness to "fill in the gaps" or confabulate. This mixture of fact and fantasy is incorporated
74. Id. at 1048.
75. Id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals suggested the following tests
!or admissibility: (1) Was the hypnotist professionally qualified to administer hypnosis? (2) If qualified, was he objective in the application of
the technique or did he suggest, by leading questions or otherwise the
responses to be made by the subject? (3) Was posthypnotic suggestion
used? Id.
76. Harding v. State, 246 A.2d at 302 (1968).
77. State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d at 1269-73 (1982).
78. Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d at 174 (Pa. 1981).
79. Diamond, supra note 15, at 314.

80. Margolin, Hypnosis-enhanced Testimony: Valid Evidence or Prosecutor's
Tool? 17, no.10 TRIAL 42 (Oct. 1981).
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into the subject's memory and the subject believes it to be
true. 1
3. Purposeful Lying. Contrary to what many laymen
believe,8" a person under hypnosis can willfully lie."
4. Undue Weight Given by Jury. To a layperson, hypnosis is "cloaked in a veil of mysticism" and seems to magically produce fantastic recall." ' Laymen commonly give great
credibility to hypnosis and a jury is likely to place undue
emphasis on what transpired during a hypnosis session. 5
5. Violation of Defendant's Right to Confrontation. A
defendant's right to cross-examination or confrontation may
be frustrated by the pre-trial hypnosis of a witness. A previously hypnotized person is subject to confabulation and
suggestion and may honestly believe this new memory to
be his true recollection. 6 The witness may testify with great
conviction, believing he is telling the truth, and thereby deny
the jury the opportunity to observe his demeanor and to
judge his credibility absent the hypnotic influence. 7
E. Reaction To The Problems: A Summary
In Harding and the early cases, the courts gave very
little recognition, if any, to the problems associated with
hypnosis and relied on cross-examination of the previously
hypnotized witness to test the credibility of hypnotically
refreshed testimony. 88 The application of the Harding rule
and the growing use of hypnosis within the judicial system
began to concern experts in the field of hypnosis.8 In a
recent article, Dr. Bernard L. Diamond addressed the problem of the current hypnosis boom within the criminal jus81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Difloff, The Admissibility of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 1, 2 (1977) (quoting 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA Hypnosis
133 (1974)).
Dilloff, supra note 81, at 5.
State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 92 (1981).
State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d at 1272 (1982).
Dilloff, supra note 81, at 9. This is the same type of concern that promoted
courts to adopt the Frye test See supra note 52.
Commonwealth v Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d at 174 (Pa. 1981).
State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d at 1274 (1982).
See upra note 30 and accompanying text.
Diamond, supra note 15, at 327-49.
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tice system and concluded that reliance on cross-examination
of previously hypnotized witnesses and direct examination
of expert witnesses is a totally inadequate means of ensuring the reliability of hypnotically refreshed testimony.,"
Diamond argued that such testimony should be inadmissible
per se since there is no way to ensure that the subject has
not incorporated into his recollection fantasies or suggestions from the hypnotist, even though "consummate care is
taken."9 1
The decisions since 1978 reflect the courts' growing recognition of these problems."2 The supreme courts of Minnesota, Arizona, and California have held that hypnotically
refreshed testimony is inadmissible because the Frye test
cannot be satisfied." Other high courts in Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Nebraska, and Maryland have stopped just short
of holding such testimony inadmissible per se and have mandated that the Frye test must be satisfied before the testimony may be received. 4 Still other courts in New Jersey,
90. Id. at 313. Dr. Diamond is a Professor of Clinical Psychiatry and Professor
of Law at the University of California. He is a nationally known specialist
in the field of hypnosis within the judicial system. People v. Shirley, 641
P.2d at 802 n.45 (1982).
91. Dr. Diamond stated:
Many courts currently admit testimony from previously hypnotized witnesses without an adequate understanding of the nature
of hypnosis and its dangers to truly independent recall. Perhaps
influenced by often naive legal scholarship and biased expert testimony, these courts apparently believe that cross-examination and
expert witness attacks on the credibility of such testimony will reveal any shortcomings in the hypnosis and get to the truth. This
hope is misplaced. Even if the hypnotist takes consummate care,
the subject may still incorporate into his recollections some fantasies or cues from the hypnotist's manner, or he may be rendered
more susceptible to suggestions made before or after hypnosis. Nor
can any expert separate them out. Worse, previously hypnotized
witnesses often develop a certitude about their memories that
ordinary witnesses seldom exhibit. Further harm is caused by
"expert" witnesses (often self-styled and police-oriented) who,
testifying -n the state's behalf, make extravagant, scientifically unjustified claims about the reliability of hypnotically enhanced
testimony. The plain fact is that such testimony is not and cannot
be reliable. The only sensible approach is to exclude testimony
from previously hypnotized witnesses as a matter of law, on the
ground that the witness has been rendered incompetent to testify.
Diamond, supra note 15, at 348-49.
92. People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d at 785 (1982).
93. State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d at 768 (Minn. 1980); State v. Mena, 624 P.2d
at 1279-80 (1980); People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d at 804 (1982).
94. See Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d at 177-78 (Pa. 1981); People
v. Hangsleben, 273 N.W.2d at 545 (1978); State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d at
655 (1981); Polk v. State, 427 A.2d at 1048 (1981).
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New Mexico and New York have mandated procedural safeguards to ensure the reliability of hypnotically refreshed
testimony."
Not all jurisdictions have completely departed from the
Harding analysis. However, among the courts following the
Harding rule since 1978, many have addressed the problems of hypnotically enhanced testimony. Significantly, there
have been other factual circumstances upon which these
courts relied in order to admit such testimony. High courts
in Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Tennessee relied on
substantial corroboration and other safeguards to admit the
testimony." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also addressed the problems of hypnotically refreshed testimony
and recommended safeguards." In spite of the trend away
from Harding, since 1978 at least three jurisdictions have
adopted the Harding analysis with little or no discussion of
safeguards: Missouri, Florida, and Wyoming."
III. THE PRINCIPAL CASE: Chapman v. State
A. The Wyoming Supreme Court's Analysis
The issue of admissibility of hypnotically refreshed testimony in Chapman v. State was one of first impression
for the Wyoming Supreme Court.9" In upholding Robert
Chapman's conviction, the majority adopted the Harding
analysis and held simply that an attack on credibility is the
proper method to evaluate the testimony of a previously
hypnotized witness.'01 The majority ruled that the defendant "had ample opportunity" to test the credibility of Logan,
the previously hypnotized complaining witness, because the
attack on Logan's credibility was "before the jury."'0 ' Re95. See State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 94-97 (1981); State v. Beachum, 643 P.2d
at 253 (1981); People v. Lewis, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 179 (1980); People v.
McDowell, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 182-83 (1980).
96. See Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364, 371 (1979); People v.
Mass.
Smrekar, 385 N.E.2d at 854 (1979); Commonwealth v. Stetson,
427 N.E.2d 926, 932 (1981) ; State v. Glebock, 616 S.W.2d 897, 904-05
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1981).
97. United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d at 199 n.12 (9th Cir. 1978).
98. See State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d at 423 (Mo. App. 1980), vacated on other
grounds 451 U.S. 1013 (1981); Clark v. State, 379 So. 2d 372 (Fla. App.
1979); Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo. 1982).
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ferring to defendant's cross-examination of the prosecution
witness and direct examination of the police hypnotist and
the defense hypnosis expert, the majority ruled that the
defendant failed to show Logan was testifying from anything other than his own memory or that the hypnotist had
given him any improper suggestions. 102 Summarily recounting what it apparently considered to be the pertinent facts,
the majority simply stated that the defendant had described
the burglar after the episode, was later hypnotized, then
identified Chapman first from a photo line-up and again in
court.'0 3 The court rejected as unworkable and improper defendant's suggested six-point foundation requirement' and
held that "an attack on credibility is the proper method to
determine the value of the testimony of a previously hypnotized witness.''15
B. Critique of the Court's Analysis
Strikingly absent from the majority opinion is any discussion whatsoever of the hypnotist's qualifications, the hypnosis procedures employed, or the recognized unreliability
of hypnotically refreshed testimony. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brown succinctly identified the major flaw in
the court's analysis: "The majority has totally failed to recognize, or even consider, the potential for abuse and the unreliability of hypnotically enhanced testimony."'0 0
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, various
jurisdictions have developed different sets of safeguards
while others have relied on the Frye test to limit the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony.' 7 The author
suggests that, stripped to the bone, the various safeguards
can be reduced to three basic, but essential, questions that
the court should consider prior to admitting hypnotically
refreshed testimony:
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 13.
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d at 1284 (Wyo. 1982).
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1281-82.
Id. at 1282.
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1284.
Id. at 1287.

107. See eupra notes 36, 47, and 69, and accompanying text.
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(1) Is hypnosis generally accepted within the scientific
community as an accurate means of enhancing recall?
(2) Was the hynotist qualified? and
(3) Were correct procedures used to produce the hypnotically enhanced recall?
In order to put the court's holding in the proper perspective,
it is necessary to review the facts in Chapman as they relate
to these three basic questions.
1. The Hypnotist. The hypnotist employed by the Worland authorities was simply not qualified. Logan was the
first witness he had ever hypnotized in the course of a criminal investigation and this took place only one month after
his hypnosis training. He neither had a degree in psychology
nor had he taken any college courses in the subject."' 8 Most
authorities agree that the hypnotist should be experienced
in forensic hypnosis and have a medical background, preferably in psychology or psychiatry."
This raises serThe hypnotist was a police officer.'
ious questions as to his "neutrality". Since a person under
hypnosis frequently exhibits a desire to please the hypnotist,
a neutral hypnotist is vital."' Hypnosis is used frequently
by authorities where there is little evidence and the victim
of the crime is extremely eager to aid the police. Since a
subject is so suggestible he may respond according to what
he perceives the desired response to be. The hypnotist need
not give any direct suggestion in order for the subject to
try to please him."' In Chapman both the hypnotist and his
subject were police officers."'
2. Procedural Safeguards. No adequate record of the
hypnosis sessions was made. The sessions were videotaped
but the tapes were so inaudible that they were useless.""
638 P.2d at 1287 (Brown, J., dissenting).
....
Orne, supra note 20, at 338-39.
Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d at 1281 (Wyo. 1982).
Diamond, supra note 15, at 333.
Commonwealth v. Nazarovitch, 436 A.2d at 174 (Pa. 1981) (citing Levitt,
The Use of Hypnosis to 'Freshen' the Memory of Witnesses or Victims, 17
no. 4 TRIAL 57 (Apr. 1981).
113. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 2.
114. Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d at 1281 (Wyo. 1982).
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
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Without a record of some kind, it is impossible to determine
whether improper suggestions were made to the subject.11
There was an added risk of improper suggestion due to the
fact that the hypnotist and his subject were not alone during the sessions-the investigating officer and others were
present.
3. Foundation. In an apparent effort to prevent the
jury from giving undue weight to Logan's testimony, the
district court allowed Logan to testify without informing
the jury that his testimony had been hypnotically refreshed.
No prior foundation was established regarding the reliability
of such testimony.1 ' The defendant chose to address the
issue on cross-examination and in his case in chief."" The
Wyoming Supreme Court held that the appellant had "ample
opportunity" to test the credibility of the witness."'
The prosecution's entire case in chief consisted of Logan's post-hypnosis identification of Chapman." ' Absolutely
no safeguards were employed to ensure the reliability of the
induced recall. The majority opinion simply ignored this
void. The Worland authorities did not necessarily do anything improper, but such a total lack of safeguards makes
the possibility of abuse a real one.
On appeal the defendant urged the Wyoming Supreme
Court to adopt the six procedural requirements set out in
20
The court rejected those safeguards as
State v. Hurd.1
"unworkable" since hypnosis is fraught with variables.'12 In
this, the court is in accord with other jurisdictions.
115. It has been recognized that making a record of the hypnosis session is a
procedure that has "clear merit." LOUISELL & MUELLER, 1 FEDERAL EviEDENCE § 106 (1977).
116. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 4-8.
117. Id. at 9-10.
118. 638 P.2d at 1282.
119. In rebuttal the state offered testimony from one of Chapman's cellmates.
He testified that Chapman had made incriminating statements about the
burglary. The defendant offered testimony from another cellmate who
testified that he was present during the conversation and Chapman had
not made such statements. Brief for Appellant, supra note 1, at 11, 40.
120. Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d at 1282 (Wyo. 1982); See also State v. Hurd,
432 A.2d at 96-97 (1981).
121. 638 P.2d at 1283-85. The court recognized the "differences between subjects
in their degree of involvement in hypnosis" and "the potential for role
playing". Id.
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The Supreme Courts of Nebraska and California have
also rejected the Hurd requirements as impractical and inadequate as safeguards because they do not address all of
the problems inherent in such testimony. Both courts, however, have held hypnotically enhanced testimony inadmissible since it is not generally accepted within the scientific
community as reliable.2 2 While the Wyoming court did not
have the benefit of these two recent cases when Chapman was
decided, it is nevertheless interesting to compare the holdings. All three courts expressed the same reluctance to adopt
the Hurd safeguards but, while the other courts held the
testimony inadmissible, the Wyoming court made hypnotically enhanced testimony virtually always admissible. The
court did "suggest" that "complying with some or all of
these safeguards" may be advisable, but it declined to "mandate" them.'23 Thus, the court encouraged the use of safeguards but, by rejecting the suggested requirements and
failing to adopt safeguards of its own choosing, the court
encouraged abuse of the memory-enhancing technique. Due
to the complete absence of safeguards in Chapman and the
court's failure to adopt at least minimum requirements, the
apparent result of the holding is that, in Wyoming, the standard for admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony is
"anything goes".
On the facts, Chapman is easily distinguished from the
authority on which the court relied. The majority relied on
the Harding line of cases to support its holding that the
credibility of a witness who has been previously hypnotized
is a matter for the jury." 4 In every case that the majority
cited, at least one or two facts or procedural safeguards
made it easier for the courts to follow the precedent that
hypnosis "goes to the weight and not the admissibility" of
testimony. In Hardingv. State, where the rule was originally
enunciated, the hypnotist was a clinical psychologist experienced in hypnosis and there was overwhelming corrobora122. State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d at 654, 655 (1981); People v. Shirley, 641 P.2d
at 787 (1982).
123. 638 P.2d st- 1283.
124. Id. at 1282.
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tion pointing to the guilt of the defendant. "' In United
States v. Awkard12

the hypnotist was a physician and an

internationally respected authority on hypnosis and there
was corroborative evidence of defendant's guilt. The court
nevertheless recommended that a foundation be laid concerning the reliability of hypnosis.'27 The hypnosis session was
videotaped in United States v. Narciso s and the hypnotist
was again a physician and an expert in hypnosis.1 2 -9 Even

in Clark v. State, 3 ' where there was very little discussion
of safeguards, the police officer was an experienced hypnotist.'
In Creamer v. State32 there was corroboration and
the hypnotist was a psychologist.'33 In People v. Smrekar
the court pointed out that the hypnotist was a physician
competent in hypnosis, that there was "substantial corroboration" and that the evidence indicated that there had been
no improper suggestion during hypnosis.'
The majority
3
also cited People v. Hughes" in which the county court required a "proper foundation" and indicated that procedural
safeguards were necessary to ensure reliability. The hypnotist was a clinical psychologist with 10 years experience in
hypnosis and the sessions were tape recorded.'36 In State v.
McQueen"7 the hypnosis sessions were tape recorded and
there were other corroborating circumstances. 3 ' And in the
final case that the majority cited, State v. Jorgensen, ° a
physician performed the hypnosis and the session again was
tape recorded. 4 ' Due to the complete lack of any safeguards
whatsoever in Chapman, the court's holding is somewhat of
an anomaly.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

246 A.2d at 305.
597 F.2d at 667.
Id. at 669, 671.
446 F. Supp. 252 (D.C. Mich. 1977).
Id. at 280.
379 So. 2d at 372 (Fla. App. 1979).
Id. at 375.
205 S.E.2d 240 (1974).
Id. at 241.
385 N.E.2d at 854-55. S~e supra note 42; and accompanying text.
99 Misc. 2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (County Ct. 1979).
Id. at 644, 648-49.
295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978).
Id. at 427, 428.
8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971).
Id. at 315.
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CONCLUSION

When the Wyoming Supreme Court decided Chapman,
the law concerning admissibility of hypnotically enhanced
testimony was in a state of flux. Still, the court failed to
recognize the concern for safeguards evident even in Harding and other early cases and chose not to join the clear
movement toward adoption of specific procedural safeguards or tests for admissibility. Since this was a question
of first impression for the court, Chapman presented a
unique opportunity to clearly define a practical standard
for the admissibility of hypnotically enhanced testimony in
Wyoming. Due to the total absence of safeguards employed
in Chapman and the court's apparent mistrust of "complex"
safeguards, it is surprising that the court did not simply
hold the testimony inadmissible or at least define certain
minimum procedural requirements. Instead, the court mechanically followed an outdated and severely undermined
precedent with no mention whatsoever of the potential for
abuse when no safeguards are required. The holding would
appear to make hypnotically enhanced testimony admissible
per se in this state, regardless of safeguards. However, in
light of the recent trend in other states toward inadmissibility per se, trial courts in Wyoming would be well advised
to adopt some basic procedural safeguards prior to admitting
such testimony. For the time being, however, they must
look to other jurisdictions in developing these safeguards.
JEFF BRINKERHOFF

14 1

141. The author was employed as a private investigator by Chapman's attorney
to investigate Chapman's asserted alibi. The author spent approximately
four or five hours interviewing witnesses concerning the defendant's
whereabouts at the time of the burglary. At the request of the attorney,
the author located an expert on hypnosis. However, the author was not
further involved in the preparation of the case nor has he had any contact with anyone concerning the case since the initial alibi investigation.
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